A Crise Económica da Década de 20

Como os petroleiros russos, iranianos, chineses e indianos passaram a ficar fora das grandes seguradoras devido às sanções impostas pelos USA, o desvio de um petroleiro descoberto perto de São Tomé e Principe à uns dias atrás está relacionado com isto. Não há garantia que os Estados dos BRICS paguem o seguro, logo grande parte da OPEP+ vai entrar em redução até saber como isto vai ficar.

Os Russos não beneficiam com isto, eles precisam de vender aos parceiros, isto é um problema para eles. Isto não era esperado porque tem a ver com a incerteza dos seguros sobre os navios.
 
Dados fresquinhos da inflação nos Estados Unidos.
5.0% YoY em Março!

Muito bom! apr:)

Creio que pelo menos espaço para não subir mais os juros há....
 
Dados fresquinhos da inflação nos Estados Unidos.
5.0% YoY em Março!

Muito bom! apr:)

Creio que pelo menos espaço para não subir mais os juros há....

Devia subir mais os juros para ver se os preços realmente começam a descer via contração do consumo.

A procissão ainda vai no adro….
 
A situação nos EUA continua por um fio, a taxa de empregabilidade continuar alta é o que continua a disfarçar o problema das poupanças cairem mês após mês, valores em credito em maximos, o compre agora pague depois com records abosulutos, basta um pequeno calafrio e isto fica feio rapidamente.

Do lado empresarial, o que está pior é o sector do imobiliario de escritorio, o COVID e trabalhar de casa criou um desiquilibrio muito grande, e a procura caiu a pique e as imobiliarias não estão a conseguir ter lucro e já estão a entregar edificios ao bancos, com tendencia para piorar.

Mas se o desemprego aguentar a coisa pode continuar a se disfarçar.
 
Dados fresquinhos da inflação nos Estados Unidos.
5.0% YoY em Março!

Muito bom! apr:)

Creio que pelo menos espaço para não subir mais os juros há....

Acho que no geral já era esperado, os meses para comparação eram o início da guerra em 2022. 5% a juntar ao que já tivemos antes ainda continua a ser muito.
 
A situação nos EUA continua por um fio, a taxa de empregabilidade continuar alta é o que continua a disfarçar o problema das poupanças cairem mês após mês, valores em credito em maximos, o compre agora pague depois com records abosulutos, basta um pequeno calafrio e isto fica feio rapidamente.

Do lado empresarial, o que está pior é o sector do imobiliario de escritorio, o COVID e trabalhar de casa criou um desiquilibrio muito grande, e a procura caiu a pique e as imobiliarias não estão a conseguir ter lucro e já estão a entregar edificios ao bancos, com tendencia para piorar.

Mas se o desemprego aguentar a coisa pode continuar a se disfarçar.

A empregabilidade é só o factor mais importante para a maioria das pessoas e para avaliar a performance de uma economia. Enquanto o cidadão tiver emprego e dinheiro no bolso está tudo bem. O resto é secundário.
 
A maior ameaça à economia americana neste momento é a retracção do financiamento bancário. Os bancos estão a travar a fundo nos créditos e sem crédito não há investimento nem há aumento da produtividade. Sem aumento da produtividade a economia contrai.
 
A maior ameaça à economia americana neste momento é a retracção do financiamento bancário. Os bancos estão a travar a fundo nos créditos e sem crédito não há investimento nem há aumento da produtividade. Sem aumento da produtividade a economia contrai.
Já tinha falado disso aqui noutro tópico.

Portugal é um país mesmo diferente, todas as semanas há um escândalo diferente e enquanto se vão descobrindo os artifícios da classe política e se discute outra vez o negócio do aeroporto e onde é que fica mais bonito, por oposição à função e utilidade económica. Fora do país discute-se isto:

Here's what the fallout from the banking crisis could look like Apr 3, 2023

Konstantinos Lagos
Senior Lecturer in Business and Economics, Sheffield Hallam University
  • We are currently dealing with the worst banking crisis since 2007-8, an economist warns.
  • He says one in 10 banks are sitting on greater losses and tighter funding than Silicon Valley Bank, which collapsed earlier this month.
  • Here he presents seven possible consequences for the medium term, including further inflation hikes and a reduction in bank lending and government borrowing capacities.

With four banks down in the US and Europe and at least several more wobbling, we’re currently in the throes of the worst banking strife since 2007-08. Aggressive interest rate hikes have meant that banks are sitting on hefty losses on their portfolios of government bonds – some US$2 trillion (£1.6 trillion) or 15% losses on US banks alone.
This makes many banks vulnerable to the same kind of funding problems that brought down Silicon Valley Bank – one in ten banks are sitting on even greater losses and tighter funding, putting the lie to any idea that SVB was unusual. There may well be potential for further bank runs as anxious customers withdraw their money: US banks alone have over US$1 trillion in uninsured customer deposits. All eyes will be on Deutsche Bank and First Republic to see if they can overcome the market jitters of the past few days.

The Federal Reserve and other central banks are reassuring everyone that the financial system is sound and bears little comparison to 2008. Nonetheless, there are a number of foreseeable consequences for the medium term that are barely being discussed yet.


1. Weaker bank lending

When someone borrows money, they normally have to pay extra to borrow for a longer duration than a shorter duration, because it’s generally riskier to lend further into the future. But this flips when investors get nervous about the immediate future, which is what has happened right now (we say the yield curve has inverted). This points to a recession in the coming months.

Banks are already reluctant to lend because they are having to pay more to borrow from one another at today’s interest rates. Therefore the broader economic uncertainty is likely to make it even harder for consumers and businesses to get credit. In the aftermath of the 2007-09 crisis, US bank lending fell by almost 11% .


2. Government borrowing difficulties

Banks have got into trouble from investing in long-term government bonds, supposedly one of the safest assets in the market, which raises questions about to what extent they will be willing to do so in future. Governments typically issue bonds of upwards of a year to finance longer term or larger-scale investments, but may find this harder at a time when there are hefty bills to pay.

For instance the ageing of the huge baby boomer generation is putting significant pressure on healthcare, requiring heavy government investment into medical research, healthcare infrastructure and extra workers. The green industrial policy agenda entails enormous costs too.

If banks are not willing to buy long-term bonds are readily as before, the cost of borrowing will rise at a time when most governments are already struggling with high levels of debt.


3. More inflation

Central banks could step in and buy more government bonds directly to provide their governments with the necessary funds. Unfortunately this is tricky, since such purchases would potentially increase the money supply and make inflation worse than it is already.

​Inflation has tailed down a little in countries such as the US and UK since the peaks of 2022, but is still well above the 2% target. If central banks have to directly support more government borrowing, expect more upward pressure on prices. This in turn will put more pressure on central banks to keep interest rates higher.
So far, the Federal Reserve (the US central bank), has tried to minimise the damage by setting up a facility to allow banks to borrow against their government bonds at book value. In just a couple of weeks, US banks have already borrowed nearly half a trillion US dollars. But again, there are limits to how much assistance can be provided without jeopardising the fight against inflation.


4. Fewer jobs

So far, the jobs market in the US and also the UK has been fairly resilient. But if credit becomes more scarce and there is a recession, that situation could change quite quickly.


5. Lower house prices

The housing market in the US and UK has also held up quite well, despite higher interest rates. But in an environment of prolonged high interest rates and reduced bank lending, house prices could start falling more sharply: after the 2007-09 crisis, US house prices fell by almost 20%.


UK average house prices

Housing prices could fall sharply as a side effect of banking crisis. Housing prices could fall sharply as a side effect of banking crisis. Image: Twindig

6. Less consumer spending

With households already having to find more to cover higher mortgage payments, consumer spending is struggling. A fall in house prices and a rise in unemployment will further affect how wealthy people think they are, which could further reduce how much they are willing to spend.

UK consumer spending


Banking crisis have an eventual impact on the consumer spending as well. Banking crisis have an eventual impact on the consumer spending as well. Image: Trading Economics.


7. The demise of smaller banks

To prevent bank runs, governments could also step in and potentially insure all customer deposits: in the US, for example, customers’ money is only safe up to US$250,000, while in the UK it’s £85,000. The problem with extending this protection is that it would be both expensive and difficult to get past politicians since it means rescuing wealthy people.

This is why US treasury secretary, Janet Yellen, recently said this wasn’t an option, except maybe for big banks whose collapse could pose a systemic risk – meaning it could threaten the entire global banking system. Yet if you give greater deposit protection to these banks, you make them safer than the smaller banks – indeed, they already have tougher funding requirements in the US.

The danger is that more and more customers move their money to the bigger banks, making it more likely that the smaller banks collapse. Consumers would then have fewer banks to choose from and could end up paying higher prices for financial services or have less access to financial products.

This all points to tough choices ahead for governments and central banks. At the very least it looks likely that interest rates will need to come down to help protect banks, which may mean that we have to live with higher inflation for longer than most people were expecting.


https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/...bly-look-like?
 
GDP Is the Wrong Tool for Measuring What Matters
It’s time to replace gross domestic product with real metrics of well-being and sustainability


APPLES AND ARMAMENTS


Necessity is the mother of invention. Just as the dashboard emerged from a dire need—the inadequacy of the GDP as an indicator of well-being, as revealed by the Great Recession of 2008—so did the GDP. During the Great Depression, U.S. officials could barely quantify the problem. The government did not collect statistics on either inflation or unemployment, which would have helped them steer the economy. So the Department of Commerce charged economist Simon Kuznets of the National Bureau of Economic Research with creating a set of national statistics on income. Kuznets went on to construct the GDP in the 1940s as a simple metric that could be calculated from the exceedingly limited market data then available. An aggregate of (the dollar value of) the goods and services produced in the country, it was equivalent to the sum of everyone's income—wages, profits, rents and taxes. For this and other work, he received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1971. (Economist Richard Stone, who created similar statistical systems for the U.K., received the prize in 1984.)

Kuznets repeatedly warned, however, that the GDP only measured market activity and should not be mistaken for a metric of social or even economic well-being. The figure included many goods and services that were harmful (including, he believed, armaments) or useless (financial speculation) and excluded many essential ones that were free (such as caregiving by homemakers). A core difficulty with constructing such an aggregate is that there is no natural unit for adding the value of even apples and oranges, let alone of such disparate things as armaments, financial speculation and caregiving. Thus, economists use their prices as a proxy for value—in the belief that, in a competitive market, prices reflect how much people value apples, oranges, armaments, speculation or caregiving relative to one another.

This profoundly problematic assumption—that price measures relative value—made the GDP quite easy to calculate. As the U.S. recovered from the Depression by ramping up the production and consumption of material goods (in particular, armaments during World War II), GDP grew rapidly. The World Bank and the IMF began to fund development programs in former colonies around the world, gauging their success almost exclusively in terms of GDP growth.

saw0820Stig31_d.png
Credit: Amanda Montañez; Sources: World Bank (GDP data); U.S. Census Bureau (inequality data); Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Better Life Index data)
Over time, as economists focused on the intricacies of comparing GDP in different eras and across diverse countries and constructing complex economic models that predicted and explained changes in GDP, they lost sight of the metric's shaky foundations. Students seldom studied the assumptions that went into constructing the measure—and what these assumptions meant for the reliability of any inferences they made. Instead the objective of economic analysis became to explain the movements of this artificial entity. GDP became hegemonic across the globe: good economic policy was taken to be whatever increased GDP the most.

In 1980, following a period of seemingly poor economic performance—stagflation, marked by slow growth and rising prices—President Ronald Reagan assumed office on the promise of ramping up the economy. He deregulated the financial sector and cut taxes for the better-off, arguing that the benefits would “trickle down” to those less fortunate. Although GDP grew somewhat (albeit at a rate markedly lower than in the decades after World War II), inequality rose precipitously. Well aware that metrics matter, some members of the administration reportedly argued for stopping the collection of statistics on inequality. If Americans did not know how bad inequality was, presumably we would not worry about it.



https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gdp-is-the-wrong-tool-for-measuring-what-matters/
 
"Jerónimo Martins e Sonae lideram disparidade entre vencimento médio dos funcionários e o que recebe o líder. Em apenas 10 anos, com duas crises pelo meio, a remuneração dos gestores subiu 47% em 10 anos, a dos trabalhadores recuou 0,7%"

https://twitter.com/expresso/status/1646637132474138629

As crises não são para todos.

Depois vêm falar de que é normal, as subidas de preço e tal e que as pessoas é que não têm competência, não produzem…😂😂😂😂😂
 
Se se consegue arranjar cada vez mais gente indiferenciada e à rasca para trabalhar no retalho, como se espera que o salário suba?

Por outro lado, tendo em conta que esses grupos são relevantes noutros mercados, se têm sucesso na Polônia (Bierdronka) ou se fazem centros comerciais por toda a parte (Sonae Sierra), como é que a visão dos gestores que têm sucesso não é devidamente recompensada para os conseguirem manter?

Eu sei que neste caso é mais complicado quando se pessoaliza nos salários dos donos das empresas. Mas, abstraindo disso, enquanto tantas pessoas estiverem disponíveis para trabalhar pelo salário mínimo, não vai ser necessário subir os salários. Se não há competição pela mão de obra, não há melhoria global.
 
Se se consegue arranjar cada vez mais gente indiferenciada e à rasca para trabalhar no retalho, como se espera que o salário suba?

Por outro lado, tendo em conta que esses grupos são relevantes noutros mercados, se têm sucesso na Polônia (Bierdronka) ou se fazem centros comerciais por toda a parte (Sonae Sierra), como é que a visão dos gestores que têm sucesso não é devidamente recompensada para os conseguirem manter?

Eu sei que neste caso é mais complicado quando se pessoaliza nos salários dos donos das empresas. Mas, abstraindo disso, enquanto tantas pessoas estiverem disponíveis para trabalhar pelo salário mínimo, não vai ser necessário subir os salários. Se não há competição pela mão de obra, não há melhoria global.


O salário irá subir (SMN) sempre por concentração, muito dificilmente será diferente.

Tendo em conta o número de pessoas que morre por não ter o que comer vais ter sempre pessoas disponíveis para trabalhar por menos.

Com a globalização ainda se acentuou mais a presença de pessoas com muito pouco que procuram melhorar as suas vidas.
 
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